What Price Determinism? The Hole Story! by Rickles, Dean
What Price Determinism?




In their modern classic “What Price Substantivalism? The Hole Story” Earman and Norton
argued that substantivalism about spacetime points implies that general relativity is indeter-
ministic and, for that reason, must be rejected as a candidate ontology for the theory. More
recently, Earman has cottoned on to a related argument (in fact, related to a response to the
hole argument) that arises in the context of canonical general relativity, according to which
the enforcing of determinism along standard lines—using the machinery of gauge theory—
leads to a ‘frozen universe’ picture (grounded in an absence of changes in values of general
relativity’s observables). Prima facie this would seem to land the anti-substantivalist in wa-
ters at least as deep as those that Earman and Norton argued troubled substantivalism. In
this paper I introduce the argument in what I think are clearer terms than Earman’s, and as-
sess his treatment of the problem. For the most part I agree with Earman about the nature of
the problem, but I find aspects of his discussion wanting, especially as regards his proposed
ontology. I argue that ontological sense can be made of the changelessness if a structuralist
stance is adopted with respect to a natural class of observables.
1 Introduction.
In a recent examination of the concept of gauge freedom in relation to the constrained Hamilto-
nian formulation of theories John Earman writes that
...one key motivation for seeking gauge freedom is to take up the slack that would other-
wise constitute a breakdown of determinism: taken at face value, a theory which admits
‘local’ gauge symmetries is indeterministic because the initial value problem does not have
a unique solution; but the apparent breakdown is to be regarded as merely apparent be-
cause the allegedly different solutions for the same initial data are to be regarded as merely
different ways of describing the same evolution. Putting the point in slightly different ter-
minology, the evolution of the genuine or gauge-invariant quantities (or ‘observables’) is
manifestly deterministic. ([2003], p. 143)
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This ‘gauge interpretation’ has been applied to general relativity, and conceived of along these
lines the hole argument (discussed in §2.2) is easily evaded: the kinds of quantities that are
targeted by the hole argument—absolute quantities, such as the value of the metric field at some
spacetime point (a quantity whose evolution is supposed to be indeterministic when spacetime is
conceived along substantivalist lines)—are simply deemed to be unphysical. In Earman’s words:
The apparent breakdown of determinism is explained away by saying that what the propo-
nent of the container view [the manifold substantivalist] took to be two different...histories
is just a single history represented in two different ways in terms of gauge dependent quan-
tities. ([2002a], p. 14)
The diffeomorphism symmetry, on which the hole argument rests, is, according to this this
account, viewed as a gauge freedom of general relativity. In the framework of the constrained
Hamiltonian formalism the diffeomorphisms of spacetime are encoded (albeit in a rather bas-
tardized way, as we shall see) in the constraints. Crucially, (1) the Hamiltonian, the generator
of motion, is a sum of the constraints; (2) the observables must commute with these constraints,
and, therefore, with the Hamiltonian; (3) the constraints generate gauge transformations which,
following Dirac, we are to understand as “transformations ... corresponding to no change in the
physical state” ([1964], p.23). Given this, in evading the hole argument by adopting the gauge
interpretation general relativity is thrown from the frying pan in to the fire. The reason is that
the gauge interpretation seemingly implies that general relativistic worlds are ‘frozen’
...since the Hamiltonian constraints generate the motion, motion is pure gauge, and the
observables of the theory are constants of the motion in the sense that they are constants
along the gauge orbits. Taken at face value, the gauge interpretation of GTR implies a truly
frozen universe: not just the ‘block universe’ that philosophers endlessly carp about – that
is, a universe stripped of A-series change or shifting ‘nowness’ – but a universe stripped
of its B-series change in that no genuine physical magnitude (= gauge-invariant quantity)
changes its value with time. (Earman [2003], p. 152)
The logic is pretty much ineluctable. To repeat: if diffeomorphism-invariance comprises a
gauge freedom; the diffeomorphism-invariance is encoded in the constraints; the Hamiltonian is
a sum of constraints; and the observables commute with the constraints (the Hamiltonian), then it
follows that the observables do not change. Why? Because time-evolution is a diffeomorphism
and the observables must be invariant under such transformations; they must commute with
those changes (evolutions) in the data that are generated by the constraints. Yet such evolutions
correspond to the unfolding of a gauge transformation. General relativity’s observables do not,
then, evolve at all: they are frozen in time!
Since the original motivation for the gauge interpretation was to “sop up the non-uniqueness
in temporal evolution” (Earman [2003], p.143) the gauge resolution might seem to be about as
effective as chopping off one’s whole arm to cure a sore thumb! For one has apparently cured
the non-uniqueness temporal evolution, indeterminism—and an indeterminism of a rather ‘mild’
and peculiar sort at that (but, nonetheless, in need of an explanation)—by disposing of temporal
evolution tout court. It is, then, perhaps not surprising that many are deeply suspicious of the
problem of the frozen formalism, and that some have suggested that we simply abandon the
gauge interpretation, or at least restrict it (to ‘non-temporal’ diffeomorphisms, for example).
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The central question I wish to consider in this paper is this: Is this eradication of time and
change worth the restoration of determinism? I will argue that the price is right, providing we
can come up with a sensible way of making conceptual sense of the frozen formalism, and come
up with some way of making it compatible with the apparent profusion of change we certainly
do see around us. In the final section of this paper I attempt to provide an ontology that satisfies
this requirement. Before I get to that, I shall begin by reviewing the details of the hole argument,
qua problem of indeterminism. I then explain how the gauge interpretation works and how it is
supposed to resolve the difficulty posed by the hole argument, before going on to consider how
this interpretation leads to the problem of change.
2 The Price of Substantivalism.
In this section we see how general covariance coupled with manifold substantivalism leads to a
form of indeterminism (manifold substantivalism’s supposed ‘price’) in the context of general
relativity. Since this argument (the ‘hole argument’) is so well known, I shall be very brief,
simply presenting the necessary details in capsule form. I conclude this section with a concise
taxonomy of responses. I begin with a review of some basic background material.
2.1 Models, Symmetries, and General Covariance.
The hole argument is generally couched in the language of model theory. Recall that in the
model theoretic view of scientific theories, one is interested in mathematical structures and in
the set of models that are associated with them. In the context of general relativity, the relevant
models are of the form 〈M, g, T 〉, whereM is a 4-dimensional differentiable manifold, g is a
Lorentz signature metric tensor representing the chronogeometrical structure of spacetime (and,
of course, the gravitational field), and T is the stress-energy tensor representing the flow of
energy and momentum through each point x ∈ M. Einstein’s field equations couple g and T
so that the dynamically possible models of general relativity are those for which the pair 〈g, T 〉
satisfiesRab−(1/2)gabRcc = 8piGTab everywhere onM—whereRab andR are the Ricci tensor
and Ricci scalar constructed from gab, and G is Newton’s constant.
These field equations are generally covariant. General covariance is a symmetry of the
laws powered by diffeomorphism-invariance. It says that if 〈M, g, T 〉 is a dynamically pos-
sible model then so is 〈M, φ∗g, φ∗T 〉 (∀φ ∈ Diff(M), i.e. the group of diffeomorphisms of
M, where a diffeomorphism is a smooth one-to-one map between manifolds that possesses a
smooth inverse). In other words, diffeomorphism-invariance tells us that the application of a
diffeomorphism to a model gives us an equivalently structured model—one satisfying the field
equations—back, and this underwrites general covariance.1
We will see in §4.1 how the adoption of the view that diffeomorphism-invariance is a gauge
symmetry of general relativity, so that general covariance becomes a principle of gauge-invariance,
1Of course, I am skipping over many, many nuances here, and there are complications regarding the understanding
of both general covariance and diffeomorphism invariance; however, they are not germane to the theme tackled in
this paper.
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leads both to a natural resolution of the hole argument and, when couched within the Hamilto-
nian formulation general relativity, to an even deeper conceptual problem known as the problem
of ‘frozen dynamics.’ First, let us quickly review the essential details of the hole argument.
2.2 Earman and Norton’s Hole Argument.
In this subsection I present the hole argument in a way that will make the transition to the
subsequent sections much easier; none of the essential details of Earman & Norton’s ([1987])
original argument are erased by taking this slight liberty.
Suppose we have a dynamically possible model of general relativity 〈M, g, T 〉—M is, for
reasons that will become clear, a compact 4-manifold diffeomorphic to (i.e. with topology)
Σ × R, with Σ a compact 3-manifold representing space and R is the real line representing
(unphysical) time; g is a pseudo-Riemannian tensor on M; and T will encode any structures
representing matter (i.e. scalar fields, systems of particles, dust clouds, or whatever). The
natural interpretation is that this model represents a certain possible world: a spacetime on
which a gravitational field is defined in relation to a certain distribution of matter—this might be
our own world, for example. Now, we know from the general covariance of the theory that we
can apply a diffeomorphism φ ∈ Diff(M) toM, and thereby carry along the fields defined on
it, to generate another dynamically possible model. The complete set of diffeomorphic models
generated in this way gives an equivalence class (underDiff(M)) of models known as an ‘orbit’
of Diff(M). Let’s take two models from this orbit, 〈M, g, T 〉 and 〈M, d∗Hg, d∗HT 〉, related by
a certain type of diffeomorphism known as a ‘hole diffeomorphism.’ Let us now suppose that
the matter distribution is such that there is a region in which T = 0, i.e. a matter-free ‘hole.’
Outside of the hole and on its boundary the two models agree (they clearly agree with respect
to T everywhere). Since 〈M, g, T 〉 is a dynamically possible model, general covariance implies
that 〈M, d∗Hg, d∗HT 〉 is too. Now choose a slice Σ through spacetime such that the hole is to its
future. Clearly the two models have the same initial data on this slice since the diffeomorphism
was chosen so that the models agree everywhere but the hole. But they differ within the hole. For
example, according to 〈M, g, T 〉 there might be a ripple of gravity at the point x ∈M, whereas
according to 〈M, d∗Hg, d∗HT 〉 the ripple occupies the point y = dH(x) ∈ H ⊂ M. Since the
hole is to the future then it is apparent that Einstein’s equations cannot uniquely determine the
future behaviour of the data.2 We thus have a stark violation of determinism: worlds described
by identical initial conditions plus identical laws may diverge.
The key interpretive question is ‘Does each model represent a distinct situation, or do the
orbits as a whole represent a single situation?’ Or is there, perhaps, some other relation be-
tween models and situations? Clearly, if the models do represent distinct situations then the full
force of the indeterminism will have to be faced. Earman and Norton argue that substantival-
ists3 must be thus committed to such a view, and they then use this commitment to hang the
2One needn’t just put the hole to the future. One might put the hole to the past of the slice too; then, depending
on whether we put the slice to the past or future of the hole, we see, respectively, that either the data to the future
is underdetermined by the equations plus the initial data (so we get a case of indeterminism), or the data set on the
chosen slice is overdetermined by the equations plus the past data.
3Earman and Norton direct their argument againstmanifold substantivalism, a view they say is the most defensible
form of substantivalism in the context of modern spacetime theories. A manifold substantivalist is, roughly, one who
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substantivalist with the noose of indeterminism. The commitment flows from the fact that the
points of spacetime are taken to have their existence and identity independently of what’s going
on with the dynamical fields, therefore “shifting those fields [i.e. by applying d∗] will produce
different physical states of affairs” (Earman [1989], p. 180). Substantivalists are thus led into an
unacceptable indeterministic corner.4
Prima facie this indeterminism may not seem to present much of a problem. Since the
models in question differ only in how the dynamical fields are spread out over the points of the
manifold there will be no observable difference between them. The worlds represented by such
models will, therefore, only differ haecceitistically, in virtue of which point plays which role in
the worlds (models)—cf. Lewis ([1986], p. 221). However, if we are straightforward realists
about our theory and interpret the points of the manifold as spacetime points independently of
the fields, in the way the manifold substantivalist is supposed to, then this is, in principle, as
serious a violation of determinism as one in which the non-uniqueness in temporal evolution
manifested itself in terms of observable differences between the models.
2.3 Taxonomy of Interpretive Options.
Following Rynasiewicz [(1994)] we can distinguish three interpretive options as regards the re-
lationship between the relevant diffeomorphic models (hole diffeomorphs) and possible worlds5:
1. Hole diffomorphs represent genuinely distinct worlds, so that models and worlds stand in
a one-to-one correspondence.
2. Hole diffomorphs represent one and the same world, so that models and worlds are related
in a many-to-one fashion.
3. Only some subset of the models represent genuinely possible worlds.
Rynasiewicz calls these “model literalism” [ML], “Leibniz equivalence” [LE] (following Ear-
man and Norton), and “model selectivism” [MS], respectively. We can formalize these responses
as follows:
• ML: ∀d∗H, 〈M, g, T 〉 and 〈M, d∗Hg, d∗HT 〉 represent distinct physical possibilities.
• LE: ∀d∗H, 〈M, g, T 〉 and 〈M, d∗Hg, d∗HT 〉 represent one and the same physical possibility.
adopts the view that spacetime is like a ‘container’ and is represented by the manifold. This position involves a
realism about the points of the manifold, along with their differential and topological properties and relations, such
that the points exist (with these properties and relations) independently of any ‘contents’ and they have their identities
fixed independently of any contents.
4It is unacceptable to Earman and Norton since it is an indeterminism derived from metaphysics rather than
physics. One should not, say they, be able to dictate such matters from the comfort of one’s armchair. Note that some
responses work by arguing that determinism is a formal property of theories, so that it is quite independent of such
abstruse matters of interpretation such as the issue of the ontological status of spacetime points.
5I use ‘possible worlds,’ ‘situations,’ and ‘possibilities’ as if they were synonyms in this paper. They are not in
general, of course, but nothing hinges on this here.
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• MS: ∀d∗H, if 〈M, g, T 〉 represents a physical possibility then 〈M, d∗Hg, d∗HT 〉 does not
represent a physical possibility.
The crucial claim of Earman and Norton’s argument against manifold substantivalism is that
the adherent to such a conception of spacetime is necessarily committed to ML. This is false
for two reasons. Firstly, there’s more than one way to deny LE: one can choose ML or MS,
where the latter does not lead to indeterminism.6 Secondly, LE can in fact be endorsed by
substantivalists—see for example Hoefer ([1996]). It is not my purpose to review these options
here, we need simply to be aware of how the indeterminism is generated and how the endorse-
ment of LE cures it. The gauge interpretation that we consider in the next section works in much
the same way, though it gives us both a principled reason for adopting it and a formal framework
for making sense of it.
3 The Gauge Interpretation.
To give an interpretation of a theory is to answer the questions “Under what conditions is this
theory true?” and “What does it say the world is like?” (van Fraassen [1991], p. 242). In other
words it amounts to providing an ontology for a theory; namely, a set of possible worlds that
make the theory true. As Earman says, this involves “specifying which quantities the theory
takes to be “observables” in the sense of genuine physical magnitudes” ([2002a], p. 15). In
fact, the gauge interpretation provides only a partial answer to this problem: it says that the
observables of general relativity must be gauge-invariant.7 In other words, rather than allowing
any real-valued functions O on the phase space to represent physical observables, one simply
chooses those that are constant on gauge orbits, such that if x and y are gauge related states
then O(x) = O(y). Such quantities are said to be gauge-invariant. But we still need to know
what kinds of quantity satisfy this characterization, what they are like, what kind of world they
describe, and so on: this is the job of ontology. Hence, rather than providing us with a set of
observables, the gauge interpretation imposes a restriction on what counts as observable (and,
therefore on what form an ontology can take). There are a variety of options open to us as
regards the filling in of the details. Before we get to these, the subject matter of §5, let us first
gain some familiarity with the formalism within which the gauge interpretation works. We then
see how this interpretation secures determinism. I present only the very barest of details, and, in
the interests of clarity and brevity, I must ask the reader to take many of the results on trust.8
6Both Jeremy Butterfield ([1989]) and TimMaudlin ([1988]) espouse variants of MS. Butterfield bases his version
(a version he calls “One”) on a general denial of haecceitism based in counterpart theory, while Maudlin bases his on
an essentialism about the metrical properties of spacetime points.
7In the context of a gauge theory, only those quantities or variables that are left unchanged by gauge transforma-
tions are deemed observable and of physical significance.
8A more thorough presentation of this material can be found in Rickles ([2005b]). Belot and Earman give an
excellent account of this material in their papers “FromMetaphysics to Physics” ([1999]) and “Pre-Socratic Quantum
Gravity” ([2001]). I am much indebted to this pair of articles.
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3.1 The Hole Argument Gauged.
The standard position of physicists as regards the status of general covariance (e.g., as one finds
in textbooks on general relativity) is to interpret the general covariance of the field equations as
expressing the gauge freedom of general relativity; general relativity is then taken to be a gauge
theory with gauge group Diff(M). One can find this viewpoint voiced very explicitly in the
following well-quoted passage from Wald:
If a theory describes nature in terms of a spacetime manifold, M, and tensor fields, T (i),
defined on the manifold, then if Φ : M → N is a diffeomorphism, the solutions (M,T (i))
and (N,Φ∗T (i)) have physically identical properties. Any physically meaningful statement
about (M,T (i)) will hold with equal validity for (N,Φ∗T (i))...Thus, the diffeomorphisms
comprise the gauge freedom of any theory formulated in terms of tensor fields on a space-
time manifold. In particular, the diffeomorphisms comprise the gauge freedom of general
relativity. ([1984], p. 438)
The real root of the problem of indeterminism—so well exposed by the hole argument—according
to this gauge theoretic account, is to be understood as follows:
In a gauge theory, one cannot expect that the equations of motion will determine all the
dynamical variables for all times if the initial conditions are given because one can always
change the reference frame in the future, say, while keeping the initial conditions fixed. A
different time evolution will then stem from the same initial conditions. Thus it is a key
property of a gauge theory that the general solution of the equations of motion contains
arbitrary functions of time. (Henneaux & Teitelboim [1992], p. 3)
And again, this time from Dirac’s Lectures on Quantum Mechanics—the work which laid the
mathematical foundations of the gauge interpretation:
We have arbitrary functions of the time occurring in the general solution of the equations of
motion with given initial conditions. These arbitrary functions of time must mean that we
are using a mathematical framework containing arbitrary features, for example, a coordinate
systems which we can choose in some arbitrary way, or the gauge in electrodynamics. As a
result of this arbitrariness in the mathematical framework, the dynamical variables at future
times are not completely determined by the initial dynamical variables, and this shows itself
up through the arbitrary functions appearing in the general solution. ([1964], p. 17)
Conceived in this way, the indeterminism issuing from the hole argument is simply a nat-
ural consequence of the underdetermination resulting from the gauge freedom of the theory,
something to be found in any gauge theory. Clearly, the argument strikes manifold substantival-
ism because that view is seen as underwriting a naive realism about the underdetermined future
states, whereby diffeomorphic solutions (models; states) are held to be physically distinct and
gauge dependent quantities (such as the value at some specific spacetime point of some metrical
construction, say the scalar curvature R(x)) are thereby invested with physical reality. Again,
I don’t want to enter here into the debate between substantivalism and relationalism vis-a`-vis
the hole argument. I simply want to expose the mechanisms that allow the hole argument to
function, and to show how the gauge interpretation avoids the problem of indeterminism. The
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simple reason can be discerned from Wald’s remarks above: since the properties associated to
diffeomorphic models are physically identical, one should adopt LE, and in this way preserve
determinism. The gauge theoretical framework, understood as a subset of the theory of con-
strained Hamiltonian systems, provides the machinery for giving LE a firm technical grounding
in such a way that it is the observables that do the work.9
Setting general relativity up as an Hamiltonian system allows us to expose the dynamical
content of the theory; it lets us see general relativity as a theory about the evolution over time of
the geometry of space. The great irony is, as we shall see, that the most natural interpretation
seems to rule against any observationally significant evolution! But that story has to wait until
the next section. Let us begin by developing the hole argument in the same framework as that
in which the problem of frozen dynamics appears. This will allow us to quickly see the connec-
tions between the two problems, and understand how the latter flows from a particular way of
dealing with the former. We can then go on to introduce the gauge interpretation itself, which
corresponds to a particular way of defining the theory’s observables.
The framework is that of constrained Hamiltonian systems.10 On this approach we consider
a ‘splitting’ of spacetime M into ‘space’ Σ and ‘time’ t ∈ R, and then go on to construct
the phase space relative to this splitting. We begin by choosing an arbitrary splitting of M by
means of a diffeomorphism φ : M → S × R (where S is a 3-dimensional manifold). This
topology allows us to foliate M into slices (i.e. hypersurfaces), Σt (where t ∈ R will play
the role of time). Cutting across many preliminary moves, we then construct a phase space Γ
relative to the slicing, which we shall take to be the cotangent bundle T ∗Riem(Σ) defined over
the space of Riemannian metrics on Σ.11 Points in phase space are then given by pairs (qab, pab),
with qab a 3-metric on Σ (induced by the foliation) and pab a symmetric tensor on Σ (given by√| q |(Kab −Kcqabc ), where | q | is the determinant of q).
However, the diffeomorphism invariance of the spacetime covariant theory manifests itself
as constraints—of the general form φm(q, p) = 0, m = 1, ...,M—on (qab, pab), so that not all
points in Γ represent dynamically possible states. Those states that are dynamically possible
are given by points in the subspace (the “constraint surface” C ⊂ Γ) on which the constraints
are satisfied. The constraints of general relativity come in two flavours, the ‘diffeomorphism’ or
‘vector’ constraintHa and the ‘Hamiltonian’ or ‘scalar’ constraintH⊥ defined by:
9Earman makes the claim that “the [constrained Hamiltonian] apparatus helps to clarify the classic form of the
dispute about the ontological status of spacetime and to make precise the connection of this dispute with the fortunes
of determinism” (2002, p. 13). Earman is right that this apparatus connects up to the taxonomy of §2.3, as I show
below. However, it isn’t clear that this taxonomy itself carves up distinct ontological positions about spacetime for
the reasons I gave in §2.3.
10See Dirac ([1964]) for a very clear general exposition, and Arnowitt et al. ([1962]) for an early application to
general relativity. The constrained systems ‘bible’ is Henneaux & Teitelboim ([1992]).
11Here I follow the seemingly standard philosophers’ procedure of couching my discussion in terms of the metric
variables approach. However, I should point out that the canonical approach based on these variables is now largely
defunct and has been replaced by the connection representation (using Ashtekar variables: cf. Asktekar [1986]) and
the loop representations (a nice introduction is Ashtekar & Rovelli [1992]). These result in ‘simpler’ expressions
for the constraints and solutions for the Hamiltonian constraint (none were known for the metric variables!). The
justification for sticking with the metric variables is simply that the hole argument and the problem of change afflicts
any canonical approach and takes on much the same form regardless of which variables one chooses to map out the
phase space with.
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H⊥ = 1√| q | [qacqcd − 12qabqcd]pabpcd −√| q |R (1)
Ha = −2qac∇bpbc = 0 (2)
These two constraints allow data to be evolved by taking Poisson brackets. Thus, in general, for
an observable O ∈ C∞Γ, {O,Ha} changes it by a Lie derivative tangent to Σ and is generated
by a spatial diffeomorphism, while {O,H⊥} changes O in the direction normal to Σ. The
Hamiltonian for the theory is given by H = ∫Σ d3x NaHa + NH⊥, where Na and N are
Lagrange multipliers called the shift vector and lapse function respectively. The dynamics are
thus entirely generated by (first-class) constraints.12 Dirac’s ‘conjecture’ for such constraints is
that they generate gauge transformations; viz. “transformations ... corresponding to no change in
the physical state, are transformations for which the generating function is a first class constraint”
([1964], p. 23). This gives us a ‘taster’ of the next section’s business, for the implication is that
the evolution of states (i.e. the motion) is pure gauge!
The hole argument can be reproduced in phase space terms as follows (cf. Belot & Earman
([2001], p. 228)). Firstly, we note that the constraints generate Hamiltonian vector fieldsXH on
the constraint surface C, such that the vectors are null with respect to the geometry of C (given by
a presymplectic form)—these are the ‘gauge orbits.’ Now, consider two points (that is, two states
of the gravitational field) a = (q, p) and b = (q′, p′) lying in the same gauge orbit [a] = [b] on
C, and such that they can be joined by an integral curve of the diffeomorphism constraint. That
means there is a diffeomorphism d : Σ → Σ such that d∗p = p′ and d∗q = q′, implying that a
and b agree on the geometrical structure of Σ. Since they differ by a diffeomorphism, we know
that difference amounts to a disagreement over which points of Σ play which roles—i.e. as to
the geometrical properties assigned to the points x ∈ Σ. Hence, the diffeomorphism constraint
generates gauge transformations that act by permuting the points of a spatial slice, simply rear-
ranging their geometrical properties. (The Hamiltonian constraint is more complicated since it
generates transformations normal to an initial slice that can roughly be understood as pushing
data ‘forward in time,’ we save this for the next section).
This relates back rather nicely to the taxonomy presented in §2.3. We can simply recast the
options in the following terms. Given a pair of states a = (q, p) and b = (q′, p′), such that
d∗p = p′ and d∗q = q′ (where d ∈ Diff(Σ)), so that [a] = [b]:
• ML: ∀d ∈ Diff(Σ), a and b represent distinct physical possibilities.
• LE: ∀d ∈ Diff(Σ), a and b represent one and the same physical possibility.
• MS: ∀d ∈ Diff(Σ), if a represents a physical possibility then b does not represent a
physical possibility.
12A constraint φk is said to be “first-class” if its Poisson bracket with any other constraints is given as a linear
combination of the constraints: {φk, φi} = Cjkiφj∀i. The appearance of such constraints in a theory implies that the
dynamics is restricted to the constraint surface.
9
It is obvious that Earman and Norton’s manifold substantivalist will be forced into considering
the different points along a gauge orbit as representing distinct states of affairs since the points
of space will have different geometrical properties according to each such state. For example,
according to a it is the point x that has the maximal scalar curvature, whereas according to
b it is the point y = d(x) (where x, y ∈ Σ). If this is the case, then it is indeed true that
general relativity is indeterministic for it can, at best, determine the geometrical structure of
Σ, it cannot determine how this structure is distributed over the points. Thus, as is the case in
any gauge theory, for some initial state, there will generally be multiple, though gauge-related,
evolutions compatible with the equations of motion. The indeterministic conclusion follows
only if we accept the premise that a and b represent distinct physically possible worlds, i.e. ML.
The gauge interpretation adopts LE and it does so by endorsing the gauge invariant definition of
observables associated to the constrained Hamiltonian formulation of general relativity. In this
way, a principled avoidance of the hole argument’s indeterminism is effected. Let us now look at
this how this achieved by looking at how observables are defined in the constrained Hamiltonian
formalism (and, by comparison, in canonical theories in general).
3.2 Determinism Regained.
The perspective of most physicists is that there is a direct connection between constrained sys-
tems and gauge systems: certain constraints (the first-class ones) generate gauge transformations
on the (constrained) phase space. In particular, it is often assumed that any constraint sur-
face contains ‘redundencies,’ and these are understood in terms of gauge freedom.13 Domenico
Giulini exposes these connections very clearly in the following passage:
For systems with gauge redundancies the original phase space P does not directly corre-
spond to the set of (mutually different) classical states. First of all, only a subset Pˆ ⊂ P will
correspond to classical states of the system, i.e. the system is constrained to Pˆ . Secondly,
the points of Pˆ label the states of the system in a redundant fashion, that is, one state of
the classical system is labeled by many points in Pˆ . The set of points which label the same
state form an orbit of the group of gauge transformations which acts on Pˆ . ‘Lying in the
same gauge orbit’ defines an equivalence relation (denoted by ‘∼’) on Pˆ whose equivalence
classes form the space P := Pˆ / ∼ which is called the reduced phase space. Its points now
label the classical states in a faithful fashion. ([2003], p. 32)
The problem of indeterminism in the hole argument was found to be related to these “gauge
redundancies,” where the equivalence relation ∼ is given by the diffeomorphisms. However,
merely clarifying how the indeterminism arises has not yet provided us with a solution; we
saw in the previous subsection, that much the same interpretive options face us again in this
context.14 The following does secure determinism. If we have it that an initial data set can
evolve onto multiple data sets while respecting the equations of motion of the theory, then the
13Indeed, Earman ([2003], p. 153) speaks of the constrained Hamiltonian formalism as an “apparatus ... used to
detect gauge freedom.”
14Giulini mentions in the above quote that we can form the reduced phase space, and this would indeed eliminate
the indeterminism, by eliminating the gauge freedom. But the construction of the reduced space is often complicated
and still leaves the task of explicating what the theory is about untouched. In other words, the observables must be
found before we can label the points of the reduced space.
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gauge theoretic approach will say that the multiple data sets are gauge related. In other words,
as represented on the phase space, they will lie in the same gauge orbit and can be mapped
to each other by means of a gauge transformation. The next step, the gauge interpretation,
secures determinism within this setup: we say that only those variables that are constant on the
gauge related data sets are ‘true’ or ‘physical’ observables—these are the gauge invariant ‘Dirac
observables.’ In other words, Dirac observables will give the same value along a gauge orbit,
and there will only be differences between Dirac observables if there is a difference in gauge
orbits. Let us spell this out in a little more detail.
In general, the physically measurable properties (the observables) of an Hamiltonian system
are described by simple functions O(q, p) : Γ → R in terms of a canonical basis (a set of
canonical variables), with position qi and momenta pi, satisfying the Poisson bracket relations:
{qi, pj} = δij (3)
Systems described in such terms are, in general, rather simple to interpret: each point (p, q) in
the phase space represents a distinct physically possible state that the system can occupy. In
such ‘unconstrained’ systems, there is a unique curve—determined by the Hamiltonian function
for the system—through each point of phase space, so that a simple one-to-one understanding of
the representation relation is possible that does not lead to indeterminism or underdetermination.
However, ‘weakening’ the geometry of the phase space, and moving to gauge systems, puts
pressure on this simple direct interpretation precisely because determinism breaks down and the
canonical variables are underdetermined—and a suitably chosen initial slice will, of course, lead
to hole argument style indeterminism. When one considers systems with redundant variables
and symmetries the formulation contains constraints holding between the canonical variables.
Such constraints are a byproduct of the Legendre transform taking one from a Lagrangian to a
Hamiltonian description of a system.15
The first change to note in the shift from a Hamiltonian system to a constrained Hamiltonian
system is that the former’s ‘symplectic form’ ω is replaced by a ‘presymplectic form’ σ, so that
the phase space C of a gauge system inherits its geometrical structure from this. The presymplec-
tic form induces a partitioning of the phase space into the gauge orbits mentioned previously,
such that each point x ∈ C lies in exactly one orbit [x] ⊂ C. In this case, given the weaker geo-
metrical structure induced by the presymplectic form, the Hamiltonian is not able to determine
a unique curve through the phase points. Instead, there are infinitely many curves through the
points. However, the presymplectic form does supply the phase space with sufficient structure
to determine which gauge orbit a point representing the past or future state will lie in. Hence,
for two curves t → x(t) and t → x′(t) intersecting the same initial phase point x(0), we find
that the gauge orbit containing x(t) is the same as that containing x′(t): i.e., [x(t)] = [x′(t)].
15The idea of gauge freedom manifests itself at the level of the Lagrangian formalism too. A theory’s action
principle δ
R L(q, q˙)dt = 0 allows us to derive its Euler-Lagrange equations. Sometimes—in general relativity,
for example—these equations will be non-hyperbolic, they can’t be solved for all accelerations. This results in a
singular Lagrangian, revealing itself in the singularity of the Hessian matrix ∂2L/∂q˙k∂q˙h. This implies that when
we Legendre transform to the Hamiltonian formulation, the canonical momenta are not independent, but will satisfy
a set of relations (constraints) related to the identities of the Lagrange formalism. See Earman ([2003], pp. 144-145)
for a clear explanation of this material.
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Now, if we treat observables of constrained, gauge systems in the same way as for uncon-
strained systems—i.e. as a real-valued function O(q, p) : C → R on the phase space—we face
an obvious problem: given that the future phase point of an initial phase point is underdeter-
mined, it will be impossible to uniquely predict the future value of the observables. Hence, there
appears to be a breakdown of determinism. The initial-value problem does not appear to be well
posed, as it is for standard Hamiltonian systems. The reason is clear enough: there is a unique
curve through each phase point in a Hamiltonian system but there are infinitely many curves
through the phase points of a gauge system. The trick for restoring determinism and recovering
a well posed initial-value problem is to be restrictive about what one takes the observables to
be. Rather than allowing any real-valued functions on the phase space to represent physical ob-
servables, one simply chooses those that are constant on gauge orbits, such that if [x] = [y] then
O(x) = O(y). Such quantities are said to be gauge-invariant; these are our Dirac observables.
The initial-value problem is well posed for such quantities since for an initial state xt=0,
and curves x(t) and x′(t) through xt=0, O[x(t1)] = O[x′(t1)]. These will be the ‘first-class’
variables, where a dynamical variable O (still a function of the ps and qs) is first-class iff it
has weakly vanishing (i.e. on the constraint surface) Poisson bracket with all of the first-class
constraints:
{O, φm} ≈ 0, m = 1, ...,M. (4)
In other words, Dirac observables are constant along gauge orbits generated by the constraints,
and there will only be differences between Dirac observables if there is a difference in gauge
orbits. This view is motivated by the fact that the gauge related data sets will be indistinguishable
from the point of view of the theory’s laws. Relating this back to the hole argument, note that
quantities that are gauge dependent are such that they are altered by gauge transformation. Recall
that the constraints generate such transformations, and one of these generates diffeomorphisms
of the spatial manifold. Hence, any quantity that is dependent upon the manifold is thereby
rendered gauge dependent. This rules out precisely those quantities that the hole argument
worked against. Thus, there is no indeterminism as far as Dirac observables are concerned, for
they treat each gauge related state as one and the same, thus encoding LE.16 However, this way
of restoring determinism has a heavy price, as we chart in the next section.
4 The Price of Determinism: A Deeper Hole.
The hole argument showed how a certain interpretation, ML, led to an indeterminism in the
context of general relativity, in the sense that models with the same set of initial data are able
16Note that we haven’t had to ‘eliminate’ degrees of freedom from the phase space here; by choosing the class
of observables in this way, the gauge symmetries are retained. However, it is possible to shift to the ‘reduced phase
space’ by factoring out these symmetries, so that a ‘smaller’ space is obtained. In this case, the standard definition of
an observable, as a real-valued function on the space, is equivalent to the Dirac definition. More technically, gauge-
invariant observables naturally induce a function O[x] : Γred → R (under a submersion map pi∗), which is just to
say that such functions OΓred on the reduced phase space are automatically gauge-invariant, corresponding as they
do to gauge-invariant functions on the constraint surface. The fact that we needn’t eliminate gauge from the phase
space to achieve a gauge invariant account informs much of Rovelli’s response to the problem of change—see §5.2.
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to evolve (under suitable diffeomorphisms) onto different sets of (gauge related) data at a later
time. ML is in trouble since it has to say that the models represent distinct possibilities even
though these differences are opaque to the laws of the theory and are solely haecceitistic. The
gauge interpretation restores determinism by restricting what is observable to gauge invariant
quantities, so that local quantities like the Ricci scalar R(x) at a point x ∈ M are not what the
theory is about. Since the non-uniqueness in temporal evolution concerns gauge related data
sets, gauge invariant quantities will be entirely insensitive to such differences and will evolve
uniquely into the future. The condition for being a physical observable O (where, you will
recall,H is the Hamiltonian formed from the constraints) is:
O ∈ Oi iff {O,H} ≈ 0 (5)
From this gauge invariant vantage point, the ‘frozen formalism’ problem (determinism’s
‘price’) is well nigh ineluctable. I mentioned above that the dynamics is generated by constraints;
or, in other words, the dynamics takes place on the constraint surface, and evolution is along the
Hamiltonian vector fields XH generated by the constraints on this surface (i.e. along the gauge
orbits). For any observable O (a function of the canonical variables), the time-evolution is given
by O˙ = {O,H}. In a constrained system, the dynamics takes place on the constraint surface,
so that the equality becomes a ‘weak equality’. But on the constraint surface the observables
must commute with the constraints, as in eq.(5), and the Hamiltonian is a sum of the constraints.
Therefore, the observables are constants of the motion: dOdt (q(t), p(t)) ≈ 0 (where t is associated
to some foliation given by a choice of lapse and shift). Since such quantities are supposed to
form the basis of the ontology of the theory, it follows that no genuine physical quantities change
over time. This is the problem of frozen dynamics, or the frozen formalism. Let us unpack it a
little more.
4.1 The Frozen Formalism.
From the previous section, we can see that we have the following setup to work with. The
spacetime manifold M is a background structure with the topological structure M = R × Σ,
with Σ a spatially compact 3-manifold. The configuration space Q for the gravitational field
is the space of Riemannian metrics Riem(Σ) on Σ.17 The (extended) phase space Γ is the
cotangent bundle, T ∗Q, over Riem(Σ). And the dynamics takes place on the constraint surface
C ⊃ Γ given by H⊥ = 0 and Ha = 0, where H⊥ is the Hamiltonian constraint and Ha is
the momentum constraint, and where the ‘full’ Hamiltonian is H = ∫Σ d3x NaHa + NH⊥.
The observables of the theory have vanishing Poisson brackets with these constraints and the
Hamiltonian.
In the constrained Hamiltonian version of general relativity described in the previous section,
the constraints were shown to generate gauge transformations. This means that phase points
17As I mentioned above, there are alternative formulations according to which a connection is used as a configura-
tion variable instead of the metric. Most physics research now carried in the canonical approach to general relativity
is discussed mostly in the connection version since it lends itself better to quantization (leading, after another shift of
variables, to the loop representation and loop quantum gravity). However, the conceptual problems discussed in this
paper are quite insensitive to which variable is chosen: so long as we stick to spacetimes with the specified topology,
all are targets.
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get shunted along the orbits of the gauge group under their action, where states represented
by phase points lying on the same gauge orbit are observationally indistinguishable.18 Thus,
any transformations that are instigated by the constraints will, from this point of view, result in
equivalent physical states; the different phase points represent one and the same physical state
differently described. Since this ability to redescribe the state is unphysical, it should not be
the case that the theory’s observables should depend upon the specific descriptions used. That
is, an observable must be the same (i.e. give the same value) for all points on a gauge orbit; it
must be insensitive to any differences between them, for the differences are merely the result of
gauge freedom in the mode of representation. Sensitivity should be at the level of whole gauge
orbits, rather than their elements. We can sum this up more formally by saying that the Poisson
bracket of an observable with the constraints should vanish: observables must commute with the
constraints. Therefore they must commute with the Hamiltonian.
The problem we have is that in (Hamiltonian) general relativity all of the physical content,
the dynamics, is given by the constraints. Applying the gauge interpretation to this formalism
leads to the view that the observable Oi are those functions satisfying {Oi,H(x)} = 0. Since
one of these constraints, the Hamiltonian constraint, generates the dynamical evolution of the
canonical variables from one hypersurface to the next, the commutation condition implies that
dynamical variables must take on the same value on each hypersurface: the dynamical variables
must be constants of the motion. However, intuitively, observables cannot be constants of the
motion; how do we explain the appearance of a changing world if they are? As Earman rightly
pointed out ([2003], p. 152), this is incompatible with a B-series conception of change since
that account requires that there are things that have different incompatible properties at different
times. Hence, it is much more radical than the claims of ‘eternalism’ that are made on the basis
of the lack of becoming in special relativity’s Minkowski spacetime.
4.2 Taxonomy of Interpretive Options.
This subsection aims to provide a rough roadmap of the options we have in responding to the
problem of change. The account I give is not intended to be exhaustive, and I consider only
those responses with relevance to the issues considered in this paper. Broadly, then, there are
three basic stances we can adopt:
1. Accept the gauge interpretation along with the consequences.
2. Restrict the gauge interpretation in some way.
3. Scrap the gauge interpretation.
Earman is very much taken with the Hamiltonian formalism, and believes that the frozen
dynamics is something that must be accommodated by any sound interpretation of general rela-
tivity. That is, he opts for response 1. I agree. Tim Maudlin and Karel Kucharˇ do not. I consider
option 1 in the next section, in the remainder of this subsection we consider options 2 and 3, as
defended by Kucharˇ ([1992], [1993]) and Maudlin ([2002]) respectively.
18Note that this intended to be a very strong sense of “observationally indistinguishable.” It is not that there is no
procedure that we could use to detect a difference; rather, there is no procedure imaginable that could achieve this.
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Both Maudlin and Kucharˇ are in agreement that something has gone awry in the gauge inter-
pretation. Maudlin says we should abandon it altogether; Kucharˇ, however, has his eye firmly on
quantization, and thinks that we should retain the gauge interpretation on account of its utility in
this context, but that we should restrict it to Diff(Σ), and the transformations generated by Ha.
In other words, Kucharˇ thinks that we should restrict the gauge interpretation to the diffeomor-
phism constraint, and not view the Hamiltonian constraint as a generator of gauge. Maudlin goes
further; he thinks the frozen formalism involves “some Alice-in-Wonderland logic” ([2002], p.
13). As he explains:
Any interpretation which claims that the deep structure of the theory says that there is no
change at all – and that leaves completely mysterious why there seems to be change and
why the merely apparent changes are correctly predicted by the theory – so separates our
experience from physical reality as to render meaningless the evidence that constitutes our
grounds for believing the theory. ([2002], p. 12)
Prima facie, Maudlin is quite right, of course; on a surface reading of the formalism there
appears to be no scope for change, therefore, given the apparent existence of change, something
is wrong. However, there is scope for interpreting the formalism so as to introduce change,
as I show in §5. We can, on these interpretations, say why the surface reading is “yielding
nonsense,” as Maudlin puts it (ibid.). The answer is related to the gauge invariant response to the
hole argument (the response that is supposed to cause the problems of change in the first place):
only change with respect to the manifold is ruled out, if we focus on those quantities that are
independent of the manifold we can restore change by considering the ‘evolving’ relationships
between these quantities.19
In his response to Earman ([2002b]), Maudlin claims to be against the gauge interpretation,
yet he rather oddly appears simply to regurgitate what is the gauge theoretical lesson of general
relativity; namely, that local quantities cannot be genuine observables. Thus—referring to the
problem of frozen dynamics as “the observables argument”—he writes that
...the Observables Argument gets any traction only by considering candidates for observ-
ables (values at points of the bare manifold) which are neither the sorts of things one ac-
tually uses the GTR to predict nor the sorts of things one would expect – quite apart from
diffeomorphism invariance – to be observables. ([2002], p. 18)
Thus Maudlin charges Earman with making “a bad choice of logical form of an observ-
ables” ([2002], p. 18). However, Maudlin has in fact simply accepted the gauge-invariance
interpretation seemingly without realizing it. That values at the points of the bare manifold are
not the things one predicts cannot be separated from the issues of diffeomorphism invariance,
for it’s precisely this that results in the problems for local field quantities that we have seen in
the hole argument. Thus, we can agree, and Earman will agree, that the observables argument
(the frozen formalism), like the hole argument, gets off the ground by considering the ‘wrong’
type of observables, but this is to adopt a substantive response that buys into the gauge theoret-
ical interpretation! Nevertheless, the right observables will be frozen. Indeed, the observables
19In §5.3 I suggest that we should view the correlations themselves as observables, following Rovelli’s evolving
constants of motion interpretation; strictly speaking, on this account there is no evolution as such, one merely has the
‘appearance’ of evolution.
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he suggests as kosher are of the ‘frozen’ type—e.g. “the amount by which light from the sun
is redshifted when it reaches the Earth” ([2002], p. 13). Since there is no dependence on the
manifold, this will be gauge invariant and, therefore, will not change from slice to slice. Indeed,
another example Maudlin gives of a good observable bears striking similarity to Earman’s cho-
sen type (the “coincidence quantities” that we shall meet in the next section). Thus, he writes
that “[w]hat we can identify by observation are the points that satisfy definite descriptions such
as “the point where these geodesics which originate here meet”, and against these sorts of [lo-
cal] quantities Earman’s diffeomorphism argument has exactly zero force” (ibid.). Presumably
Maudlin has made a slip here, for points are not quantities; yet if we were to define a quantity,
like scalar curvature, at the so-defined point, then we have a quantity that fits the bill. Indeed
so, but here Maudlin is essentially gauge-fixing spacetime points and then constructing gauge
invariant quantities by attaching them to the physically defined points—the reasoning is that for
some quantity ‘F ’, physical object ‘thing’, and space point x: F (thing) is gauge invariant but
F (x) is not (cf. Isham [1993], p.15). If Maudlin is willing to go this far, then why not allow that
change is accounted for with just such observables: the evolution and change concerns the rela-
tions between things or quantities, rather than the having and losing of properties at times? One
can form of chain of values for F by using the values of ‘thing’ as the ‘ticks’ of a clock—this
is essentially what Rovelli proposes (see §5). Moreover, all of this is perfectly possible in the
context of the Hamiltonian formulation, the “surface reading” simply doesn’t go deep enough.
Rather than ruling the gauge interpretation out tout court, Kucharˇ maintains that we should
make an ontological distinction between the constraints. The spatial constraint should be viewed
as a generator of gauge transformations, but not so the Hamiltonian constraint, for that “tells us
how the state evolves” ([1993], p. 21). The simple reason is that if we do choose to view the
Hamiltonian constraint as generating gauge, then we would face the frozen formalism picture,
something Kucharˇ views as a reductio of the ‘unrestricted’ gauge interpretation:
[H⊥] generates the dynamical change of data from one hypersurface to another. The hyper-
surface itself is not directly observable, just as the points x ∈ Σ are not directly observable.
However, the collection of the canonical data (qab(1), pab(1)) on the first hypersurface is
clearly distinguishable from the collection (qab(2), pab(2)) of the evolved data on the sec-
ond hypersurface. If we could not distinguish between those two sets of data, we would
never be able to observe dynamical evolution. ([1993], p. 20)
I would say that the state of the people in this room now, and their state five minute ago
should not be identified. These are not merely two different descriptions of the same state.
They are physically distinguishable situations. (Kucharˇ in Ashtekar & Stachel (eds.) [1991],
p. 139)
This is simply the problem of frozen dynamics again: if the Hamiltonian constraint generates
gauge and observables must commute with it then observables must be constants of motion,
but, says Kucharˇ, “if we could observe only constants of motion, we could never observe any
change” (ibid.). On this basis he distinguishes between two types of variable: observables
and perennials. The former class are dynamical variables that have vanishing Poisson bracket
with the diffeomorphism constraint but that do not commute with the Hamiltonian constraint;
while the latter are dynamical variables that commute with both types of constraint (i.e. with
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the full Hamiltonian). Kucharˇ’s key claim is that one can observe dynamical variables that
are not perennials, and that we have to in order to observe change. Thus, Kucharˇ restricts the
gauge interpretation to the spatial constraint (we might call this move ‘Kucharˇ restriction’).
But there is a problem. Kucharˇ’s claim that observables should not have to commute with the
Hamiltonian constraint leads him to the internal time strategy, where an attempt is made to
construct a time variables T from the classical phase space variables. This strategy conceives
of general relativity (as described by Γ) as a parametrized field theory. The idea is to find a
notion of time hidden amongst the phase space variables. I shan’t go into the technical details,
which are in any case directed at quantization; suffice it to say, however, that general relativity
cannot be conceived in this way since it is not a parametrized field theory. To see that this is so,
we need to test whether or not the identification between the phase space Γ of general relativity
and the phase space Υ of a parameterized field theory goes through. The proposal requires that
there is a canonical transformation Φ : Υ → Γ such that Φ(Υ) = Γ. However, there can be
no such transformation because Υ is a manifold while Γ is not (cf. Torre [1993]). Hence, there
are serious, basic technical issues standing in the way of this approach. A further problem is
that Kucharˇ essentially begs the question against the unrestricted gauge interpretation by saying
that in order to observe change observables mustn’t be constants of the motion, for there are
proposals that are able to account for observed change within this framework. We turn to these
in the next section.
4.3 A Cost Versus Benefit Analysis.
As Earman points out, not everyone is taken with the constraint Hamiltonian formalism and the
gauge interpretation:
Some philosophers and physicists [i.e. Maudlin and Kucharˇ] have found this “frozen dy-
namics” so bizarre that they think it shows that the constraint apparatus, which is other-
wise so fruitful and successful in other domains, has gone haywire when applied to GTR.
([2002a], p. 14)
In his defense Earman notes that we have often had to accommodate in the scientific image
ideas “that initially shock our intuitions” (ibid.). That might be so, but in those other cases
it has always been necessary to find some way of making sense of the manifest image out of
the scientific image. We know that the frozen picture, the alleged price of determinism, is one
cost with the gauge interpretation, but what exactly do we gain by invoking the constrained
Hamiltonian formalism, along with Dirac’s treatment of the constraints? The most obvious
benefit, of course, is the recovery of determinism from the jaws of gauge dependency.20 But
Earman gives us another.
Earman proposes “that one way of testing an interpretational stance for classical GTR is to
see how well the stance lends itself to promoting a marriage of GTR and quantum physics that
20In fact, it isn’t entirely clear that the restoration of determinism is at the root of the problem of change. After
all, we identify gauge related states, by choosing gauge invariant observables, because those states are thought of as
being indistinguishable (at least relative to the laws of the theory). Hence, it is possible that a more general belief in
anti-haecceitism might underpin the frozen formalism too. However, a discussion of this point would take me too far
off track, so I leave it hanging in the air.
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issues in a successful quantum theory of gravity” ([2002a], p.16). I would, however, contest
this as a test of interpretational fitness. To my mind, one should seek an interpretation that is
consistent and cogent in itself, an ‘internal’ criterion of interpretive fitness. If an interpretation of
some classical theory satisfies this, then it will most likely lead to a successful translation into the
quantum realm. Indeed, if it has conceptual problems at the classical level, then more likely than
not, these will be reflected in the quantum theory. This is indeed shown to be the case with the
present frozen formalism example in the context of the canonical quantization approach known
as loop quantum gravity in which the gauge interpretation is adopted. In loop quantum gravity,
and many other canonical quantizations, the frozen formalism problems leads to a quantum
variation known as “the problem of time,” according to which the quantum states of the theory
do not evolve on account of the zero Hamiltonian. Even on Earman’s own terms this seems
like a bad test in the present scenario, for he appears to equivocate. He says elsewhere that we
should look at canonical general relativity and the frozen formalism problem on its own ground,
and should consider them as separate and serious independently of quantum considerations (cf.
e.g. ([2002b], p.6)). If this is all there is to prop up the benefits side, then we are in danger of a
collapse to Maudlin’s ‘anti-gauge’ perspective.
Certainly this is all Earman gives us, but there is more to be said. For one, in giving general
relativity a gauge interpretation we are forging a connection with our other best physical theories;
that is, we achieve a ‘formal unity’ with these other theories, i.e. those involved in the standard
model of particle physics. Furthermore, and related to the previous point, it fits a successful and
well established research programme going back to Dirac. However, most importantly (at least
as far as I am concerned) it meets certain expectations for what a background independent theory
(one without a fixed metric or connection on spacetime) like general relativity should look like.
Thus, we should expect such problems as the frozen formalism to arise given the independence
from the manifold that is suggested by diffeomorphism invariance. My view is that the problem
of change is a bomb we should learn to stop worrying about and love.
5 Correlational Ontologies.
As I mentioned in §3, the gauge interpretation is, as it stands, not much of an interpretation:
it does not provide an ontology, though it does place restrictions on what form an ontology
might take. It tells us, for example, that there can be no local observables, observables given as
the value of a field, or some quantity or other, at an (independently specified) manifold point.
The reason is that points are not diffeomorphism invariant, so neither are quantities defined at
points—that for me is the lesson of the hole argument. At the core of the gauge interpretation is,
then, simply a formal characterization of the observables (namely that of Dirac): sensitivity at
the level of gauge orbits, but not their elements. There are several types of quantity that satisfy
the basic characterization. For example, there are very ‘non-local’ or ‘global quantities,’ such as
the spacetime volume of a compact universe, or the spacetime average of some scalar function
of the dynamical fields. Or there are ‘relational’ or ‘coincidence’ quantities that are of the form
‘F (thing)’ or, more complicatedly, ‘value of F when and where value of G is n’ (where F and
G are gauge dependent quantities) rather than ‘F (x),’ ‘F (t),’ or ‘F (x, t).’ I shall call these latter
complex observables ‘correlational observables.’ The idea is that the elements of the correlations
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are not observables, but the correlation itself is an observable. For example, the values of the
four invariant scalar fields constructed from the metric taken at a certain point of the manifold is
not an observable, nor is the value of the electromagnetic field at a certain point of the manifold.
However, the correlation formed by the electromagnetic field’s having a certain value when and
where the four scalar fields take on a certain value is an observable. The question is, How are we
to make ontological sense of this? The proposals I consider in this section, of John Earman and
Carlo Rovelli, are intended to answer this question in such a way as to explain the appearance
of change. I argue that neither succeeds in providing a satisfactory account: both fall prey to the
same problem, concerning the nature of the relation between the correlations and the elements
of the correlation. I then show how a simple structuralist gloss on their basic position resolves
the problem in a flash.
5.1 Earman’s D-Series of Coincidence Events.
Earman’s response to the problem of frozen dynamics is to argue that although general relativity
is incompatible with both the A-series and B-series conceptions of change, it is compatible with
a revised conception change. To this end he introduces what he refers to as a “D-series” ontol-
ogy consisting of a “time ordered series of occurrences or events, with different occurrences or
events occupying different positions in the series” ([2002b], p. 3). These are events formed from
the coincidence quantities familiar from Einstein’s ‘point-coincidence argument’ (see Howard
[1999]), though it is rather more general. As an example he gives the “the Komar state,” rep-
resented by the functional relationship (the correlation) gµν(φλ) involving the coincidence such
that the metric has a certain value where the four scalar invariants of the Riemann tensor take on
a certain value ([2002b], pp. 13-4). Earman writes that “[t]he occurrence or non-occurrence of
a coincidence event is an observable matter [in the technical sense of observable]...and that one
such event occurs earlier than another such event events is also an observable matter...Change
now consists in the fact that different positions in the D-series are occupied by different coinci-
dence events” (ibid., p. 14). Thus, Earman maintains that his D-series is temporally ordered.
This is not equivalent to the B-series, consisting of a string of events which are either earlier-
then, later-than, or simultaneous with each other, because, according to Earman, that “can be
described in terms of the time independent correlations between gauge dependent quantities
which change with time” (ibid., p. 15). B-series change, says Earman, is an artifact of the local
representations (the elements of the equivalence class of metrics) rather than a real feature of
the world, that associated with the equivalence class itself (to which his D-series is supposed to
apply).21 This is a strange way of viewing the content of B-series time, and I have never seen
any philosophers of time dabbling with such concepts before: why does the B-series depend on
gauge-dependent quantities? Perhaps it is a way to understand the B-series given an ontology
that sticks by the gauge dependent quantities, but for different ontologies it needn’t follow. If,
for example, we adopt a standard ontology of events then it seems that Earman has simply
constructed a B-series all over again.
Earman claims that a coincidence event “floats free of the points of M” and “captures the
21What Earman means by a “local representation” in this context is, I think, what Rovelli calls a “local universe”
([1992]): a world in which properties are ‘attached’ to spacetime points. In other words, the elements of the orbits.
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intrinsic, gauge-independent state of the gravitational field” (ibid.). General covariance implies
that if this state is represented by one spacetime model it is also represented by any model from
a diffeomorphism class of its copies. Now, Earman’s interpretation of this, and his resolution
of the problem of change, is to claim that the notion of spacetime points, properties localized
to points, and change couched in terms of relationships between these, is to be found “in the
representations” and not “in the world” (ibid.). This conclusion is clearly bound to the idea that
in order to have any kind of change, a subject is required to undergo the change and persist
through the change. In getting rid of the notion of a subject (i.e. spacetime points or objects),
Earman sees the only way out as abolishing change in this sense. The idea that change is a
matter of representation is one way (not a particularly endearing one, say I) of accounting for
the psychological impulse to believe that the world itself contains changing things, though I
think it needs spelling out in much more detail than Earman has given us.
As Earman is quick to note, there is something weird about an ontology based on such
coincidence quantities since
[w]e are used to thinking of an event as the taking on (or losing) of a property by a subject,
whether that subject is a concrete object or an immaterial spacetime point or region. But the
coincidence events in question are apparently subjectless. Note also that one doesn’t verify
the occurrence of a coincident event by first measuring the values of the electromagnetic
and the scalar fields in question, and then verifying that the required coincidence of the
value of the former with the latter does indeed hold; for by themselves none of these fields
are gauge invariant quantities and so cannot be measured. The verifying measurement has
to respond directly to the coincidence. ([2002b], p. 15-6)
Earman is not entirely forthcoming on how this idea might be cashed out. However, I think
an approach developed by Rovelli provides a suitable formal underpinning. Moreover, given a
structuralist gloss this framework is sufficient to provide a sensible ontology for the theory that
is well equipped to avoid the problem of the frozen formalism, and it avoids a further problem,
presented in §5.3, with the correlation strategies of Earman and Rovelli. Let us begin by looking
at Earman’s tentative response, before introducing an idea of Rovelli’s that looks suspiciously
like realism about gauge dependent quantities (quantities defined on the extended phase space).
The structuralist gloss I give the correlation interpretation avoids this kind of realism.
5.2 Rovelli’s Evolving Constants and Partial Observables.
Rovelli’s evolving constants of motion proposal is made within the framework of a gauge-
invariant interpretation. Like Earman, he accepts the conclusion that quantum gravity describes
a fundamentally frozen reality, but argues that sense can be made of dynamics and change within
such a framework. Take as a naive example of an observablem = ‘the mass of the rocket’. This
cannot be an observable of the theory since it changes over (coordinate) time; it fails to commute
with the constraints, {m,H} 6= 0, because it does not take on the same value on each Cauchy
surface reached by applying the constraints. Rovelli’s idea is to construct a one-parameter fam-
ily of observables (constants of the motion) that can represent the sorts of changing (evolving)
magnitudes we observe. Thus, instead of speaking of, say, ‘the mass of the rocket’ or ‘the mass
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of the rocket at t’, which are both gauge dependent quantities,22 one speaks instead of ‘the mass
of the rocket when it entered the asteroid belt’,m(0), and ‘the mass of the rocket when it reached
Venus’, m(1), and so on up until m(n). These quantities are gauge-invariant, and, hence, con-
stants of the motion; but, by stringing them together in an appropriate manner, we can explain
the appearance of change in a property of the rocket. The change we normally observe taking
place is to be described in terms of a one-parameter family of constants of motion, {m(t)}t∈R,
an evolving constant of motion.23
However, technically, it is hard to construct such families of constants of motion as phase
functions on the phase space of general relativity. For this, and other reasons, Rovelli has re-
cently shifted to an earlier view of his involving a distinction between what he calls ‘partial
observables’ and ‘complete observables,’ where the former is defined as a quantity to which we
can associate a measurement leading to a number, and the latter is defined as a quantity whose
value can be predicted by the relevant theory, i.e. a (gauge-invariant) Dirac observable (Rovelli
[1992] and [2002]). The formal setting for this view is the unreduced phase space, where we
let the observables enforce the gauge invariance (it is, in other words, a gauge interpretation).
The theory describes relative evolution of gauge-dependent variables (i.e. partial observables)
as functions of each other. No variable is privileged as an independent one (cf. Montesinos et
al. [1992], p. 5). How does this resolve the problem of change? The idea is that coordinate
time evolution and physical evolution are entirely different beasts. To get physical evolution, all
one needs is a pair 〈C, C〉 consisting of an extended configuration space (coordinated by partial
observables) and a function on T ∗C giving the dynamics. The dynamics concerns the relations
between elements of C, and though the individual elements do not have a well defined evolution,
relations between them (i.e. correlations) do, though they are independent of coordinate time.
Partial observables can be measured but not predicted, and complete observables are corre-
lations between partial observables that can be both measured and predicted. The key question
is: ‘how can a pair of partial observables make a complete observable?’ (cf. [2002], p. 124013-
5); or, in other words, “how can a correlation between two nonobservable [gauge-dependent]
quantities be observable?” ([2002], p. 124013-1). A simplified answer goes like this. Con-
sider two non-gauge-invariant (i.e. gauge dependent) functions α and β. These are our partial
observables; we can suppose that α is the matter density of a compact hypersurface and that β
is the volume of a compact hypersurface. Recall that neither of these quantities is predictable,
for their evolution will be gauge-dependent. We want to construct from this pair of partial ob-
servables a complete observable Eτα|β (where τ will be understood to be a ‘clock’ variable). To
do this we consider the relational quantity that is formed by correlating the values of the two
partial observables. We arbitrarily take one of the partial observables to be the ‘clock’ whose
values will parameterize the evolution of the other. Let β be the clock. Eτα|β then gives the
quantity that gives the value of α when, under the flow generated by the constraints, the value
of β is τ . Thus, a partial observable is evolved along a gauge flow, such that the evolution is
22Unless, of course, t is itself a physical variable, in which case we have an example of a gauge invariant correlation
observable.
23Rovelli’s approach has a certain appeal from a philosophical point of view. It bears similarities to four-
dimensionalist, temporal parts views on time and persistence (see, for example Sider ([2001])). The basic idea
of both of these views is that a changing individual can be constructed from essentially unchanging parts. I think
philosophers of time might perhaps profit from a comparison of Rovelli’s proposal with these views.
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a gauge-transformation, and is to be understood as a clock ‘ticking’ along the gauge orbit. On
its own, of course, this is an expression of the problem of change since evolution along a gauge
orbit is just the problem! But when we correlate another partial observable with the values at
which β = τ we form a time-independent observable since the value of α when β = τ does not
change. Variation in τ allows for the formation of a 1-parameter family of complete observables
that correspond to empirically observable change. The evolution does not occur with respect to
some background time parameter, but with respect to the values of the arbitrary clock; the com-
plete observables will predict the value of α at the ‘time’ β = τ . More precisely, the evolution
will be a map Eτ : Eτ0α|β → Eτ+τ0α|β , taking complete observables into complete observables. The
fact that the clock β is arbitrary (since it can be chosen from C∞(C) ⊂ C∞(Γ)) implies that
the theory is a multi-fingered time formalism: there are numerous (infinitely many) choices that
one can make for the clocks, and so there are numerous times—though not all choices will be
‘good’ clocks physically speaking. We might speculate that Rovelli’s framework of partial and
complete observables provides the technical grounding for Earman’s D-series. In other words,
the D-series gives us a ‘picture’ of Eτiα|β .
5.3 An Ontology of Structural Correlations.
As we have seen, both Earman’s and Rovelli’s responses belong in the category of ‘correlation
strategies,’ according to which space, time and change are captured by relationships (correla-
tion observables) holding between things or quantities. But such strategies, as implemented by
Earman and Rovelli at least, face the following simple problem:
...one could [try to] define an instant of time by the correlation between Bryce DeWitt
talking to Bill Unruh in front of a large crowd of people, and some event in the outside
world one wished to measure. To do so however, one would have to express the sentence
“Bryce DeWitt talking to Bill Unruh in front of a large crowd of people” in terms of physical
variables of the theory which is supposed to include Bryce DeWitt, Bill Unruh, and the
crowd of people. However, in the type of theory we are interested in here, those physical
variables are all time independent, they cannot distinguish between “Bryce DeWitt talking
to Bill Unruh in front of a large crowd of people” and “Bryce DeWitt and Bill Unruh and
the crowd having grown old and died and rotted in their graves.” ... The subtle assumption
[in the correlation view] is that the individual parts of the correlation, e.g. DeWitt talking,
are measurable when they are not. (Unruh [1991], p. 267)
A similar criticism to Unruh’s comes from Kucharˇ ([1993], p. 22), specifically targeting Rov-
elli’s evolving constants approach. Kucharˇ takes Rovelli to be advocating the view that observ-
ing “a changing dynamical variable, like Q [a particle’s position, say], amounts to observing a
one-parameter family Q′(τ1) := Q′ + P ′τ = Q − P (T − τ), τ ∈ R of perennials” (ibid., p.
22)—where a perennial is a variable that commutes with all of the constraints. By measuring
Q′(τ) at τ1 and τ2 “one can infer the change ofQ from T = τ1 to T = τ2” (ibid.). So the idea is
that a changing observable can be constructed by observing correlations between two dynamical
variables T and Q, so that varying τ allows one a notion of ‘change of Q with respect to T ’.
Kucharˇ objects that one has no way of observing τ that doesn’t smuggle in non-perennials (i.e.
non-gauge invariant quantities, or partial observables).
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Belot and Earman question Unruh’s and Kucharˇ’s interpretation of the correlation view here,
and suggest that it might be better understood “as a way of explaining the illusion of change
in a changeless world” ([2001], p. 234). The basic idea is just the kernel of the correlation
strategy; namely, that one should deal in quantities of the form “clock-1-reads-t1-when-and-
where-clock-2-reads-t2”. We get the illusion of change by (falsely) taking the elements of these
relative (correlation) observables to be capable of being measured independently of the corre-
lation. (They suggest that Rovelli’s notion of evolving constants of motion is a good way of
“fleshing out” the relative observables view. Presumably they would include the partial observ-
ables programme too.) However, if it is false to take the individual elements of the relational
quantity to be measured independently, then we are owed an account of the sense in which this
is false. The problem remains, as Unruh writes, “[o]ne cannot try to phrase the problem by
saying that one measures the gauge dependent variables, and then looks for time independent
correlations between them, since the gauge dependent variables are not measurable within the
context of the theory” ([1991], p. 266).
In fact, I think both Unruh and Kucharˇ are guilty of the same non sequitur, though not for the
reason given by Belot and Earman. One doesn’t need to observe τ independently of Q: we can
simply stipulate that the two are a ‘package deal,’ inseparable, or else that the correlations are
primary with the individual elements being ‘structurally constituted’ by the correlation. In other
words, we suppose the correlations are ‘undecomposable’ or ‘non-factorizable;’ the elements
of the correlation have whatever properties they have in virtue of the correlation. In this way,
I think both Unruh’s and Kucharˇ’s objections can be successfully dealt with. However, neither
Earman nor Rovelli are able to get around this problem with their responses. Both Earman
and Rovelli appear to want to cling to the notion that the ‘elements’ of the correlations (the
partial observables or coinciding elements) have some independent physical reality. This is
most explicit is Rovelli claiming that the partial observables (the elements of correlations) “are
the quantities with the most direct physical interpretation in the theory” (ibid., p. 124013-7). I
say, this is the wrong way around.
If the correlations (coincidence events, complete observables, or whatever) are subjectless,
as indeed they seem to be and as Earman mentioned, then the components only have their indi-
viduality in virtue of the correlation that binds them together. But note that this does not tell us
anything about priority: the correlation does not necessarily come before the fields (or ‘corre-
lata’ as I shall refer to them). Thus, this is a structuralist position—Rovelli, Smolin, and others
appear to see this as supporting relationalism; however, that position requires the independent
reality of the relata, which leads to problems in this case (likewise for substantivalism). The
ontology is structural. Once we take this on board, we have an ontology capable of dealing
with the frozen formalism: it is the correlations that evolve—the appearance of change in gauge
dependent quantities is due to the fact that we happen to decompose correlations. But that we
do tend to do this does not imply that the decomposition must be a genuine possibility. Just as
one can ‘imagine’ splitting a Democritean atom, in a possible world with such atoms this is not
a real possibility at all. We can also escape Unruh and Kucharˇ’s objection since, on this account,
it is not the case that the correlation observables can, ontologically speaking, be ‘broken down’
into individual parts.
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I shall call the overall structure formed from such correlations a correlational network, and
the correlates I shall call correlata. Change is at the level of the correlational structure (a vari-
ation in correlations), but there is a derivative ‘trickle down’ effect from the correlations to the
correlata. There are two core ways of understanding the structuralist position I have described:
one in which neither the correlation nor the correlata is given ontological priority; and one in
which the correlations are given priority over the correlata. The former option can be understood
along the lines of Skyrms’ ‘Tractarian Nominalism.’ The idea here is to understand individuals,
properties, and relations as ‘abstractions’ from the structure of the world (i.e. the correlational
network) but not as existing independently of that structure: “We may conceive of the world not
as a world of individuals or as a world of properties and relations, but as a world of facts - with
individuals and relations being equally abstractions from the facts” ([1981], p. 199). Likewse,
the ‘totality of facts’ (the structure of the world) itself is ‘composed’ of such facts. As regards
the question of ontological priority, then, we see that relations and relata (correlations and corre-
lata) share the same status: “the Tractarian Nominalist ... takes both objects and relations quite
seriously, and puts them on par. Neither is reduced to the other” ([1981], p. 202). The second
option, the one I favour, can be understood by analogy with Armstrong’s ‘states of affairs’—
this is, I think, more applicable to the ‘decomposition problem’ of Unruh and Kucharˇ. Thus,
speaking in terms of ‘states of affairs’ rather than ‘facts,’ Armstrong writes that “while by an act
of selective attention they [individuals, properties, and relations] may be considered apart from
states of affairs in which they figure, they have no existence outside states of affairs” ([1986],
p. 578). Likewise, the correlations are the fundamental things; they are things that can be mea-
sured and predicted: the stuff out of which reality is made. The correlata are measurable only in
virtue of their position in the correlation, and have no independence outside of this. However,
the correlata are our access point to the correlations, and this is why, I think, Rovelli imbues his
partial observables with fundamental significance. If his, and Earman’s, position is to escape
the interpretive troubles highlighted by Unruh and Kucharˇ, however, the primacy needs to be
reversed and shifted to the complete observables. By taking these seriously, as an ontological
basis, those difficulties are easily resolved, along with the problem of frozen dynamics. In this
way, we see that the claims about the demise of change is overcooked. Change is possible, but
it is a revised conception not involving any background spatial and temporal structure. This is a
natural notion from the perspective of a structuralist ontology.
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